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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Use of Fee Simple Deter-
minable to Enforce Racial Restrictive Provisions
In Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer,' the
North Carolina Supreme Court recently held that land deeded in fee
simple determinable would revert to the grantor if certain racial re-
strictions were not complied with, without violating the Equal Pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 This holding deserves
close scrutiny by layman and lawyer.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 3  This applies to any agency whereby
the state exercises its powers, whether legislative, administrative, or
judicial.4 Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the courts
have applied the Equal Protection Clause to determine the legality
of state action in a number of racial segregation cases. Thus, pro-
visions for racial segregation in municipal housing ordinances, 5 statutes
denying Negroes the right to vote in primary elections, 6 statutes dis-
criminating against Negroes in the selection of jurors,7 and the refusal
by a board of trustees of a library supplied with state funds to admit
a Negress to a library training courses were held to be unwarranted
extensions of state power and, therefore, in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
Court action, as violative state action, formed the basis for the
Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer.9 Several property
owners in St. Louis sought to enjoin a Negro purchaser of real estate
encumbered with a racial restrictive covenant from moving into their
242 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. 2d 114 (1955).
- U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
' Ibid.
'Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1880); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339
(1880).
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S.
704 (1930). State courts have held similar ordinances invalid: Glover v. Atlanta,
148 Ga. 285, 96 S. E. 562 (1918); Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 103 Atl. 910
(1918) ; Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 217 N. C. 119, 65 S. E. 2d 867 (1940) ; Allen
v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 42, 52 P. 2d 1054 (1936); Liberty Annex Corp. v.
Dallas, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 289 S. W. 1067 (1927); Irvine v. Clifton Forge,
124 Va. 781, 97 S. E. 310 (1918).
'Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927).
" Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879).
'Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F. 2d 212 (4th
Cir. 1945).
1-334 U. S. 1 (1948).
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residential district. The residents had previously signed an agreement
mutually promising to restrict the use and occupancy of their land to
Caucasians. The lower court granted the injunction.'0  The Supreme
Court, however, held that the injunction granted by the Missouri court
was such state action as contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment
to constitute a denial of equal protection to members of the excluded
race." Without the state court's action, the restrictive covenant could
not have been enforced. The Supreme Court recognized that while the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state action, it did not reach private
agreements, however discriminatory. Their "enforcement," however,
was limited to voluntary adherence to the covenant by the contracting
parties.'
2
Following this decision, the Supreme Court carried the "state action"
concept one step further in a damage suit brought by one co-
covenantor against another for breach of a racial restrictive covenant. 13
The Supreme Court, basing its decision on the Shelley case,' 4 held
that, although the covenant was valid, and no constitutional rights had
been violated, a judgment awarding damages would be prohibited by
the Amendment.15
Since the above decisions dealt primarily with attempted court en-
forcement of racial restrictive provisions in deeds conveying land, the
10 Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S. W. 2d 679 (1946).
" See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 (1948), announcing the same rule
for the District of Columbia. Prior to this decision the courts consistently en-
forced racial restrictive covenants. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323 (1926);
Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217 (1918) ; Burkhardt v. Lofton,
63 Cal. App. 2d 230, 146 P. 2d 720 (1944). For North Carolina decisions see
Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710 (1946)
(validity of covenants conceded); Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E.
496 (1930) (damages awarded).
12 Following the Shelley decision, four actions seeking damages for breach of
covenant were brought in state courts. Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W.
2d 127 (1949) and Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P. 2d 1017 (1951)
limited the Shelley rule to remedy by injunction, but Robert v. Curtis, 93 F.
Supp. 604 (D. C. D. C. 1950) and Phillips v. Naff, 332 Mich. 389, 52 N. W. 2d
158 (1952) interpreted Shelley v. Kraemer to hold that enforcement of covenants
in judicial proceedings was unconstitutional whether action was brought at law
or in equity.
"
3 Jackson v. Barrows, 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
1 "The [Shelley] decision sounds the death knell for all racial restrictive
covenants and related superficially legal schemes as effective weapons in enforc-
ing racial discrimination." Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate-Property
Values v. Hitman Values, 24 NoTRE DAMFE LAW. 157, 190 (1948).
1" In a similar action, the Texas court rejected an attempt to indirectly enforce
a racial restrictive covenant. Clifton v. Puente, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 218 S. W
2d 272 (1948). There, the purchaser, a Mexican, brought an action in ejectment
against a prior grantee who defended his refusal to vacate on the ground that
the deed under which the Mexican claimed contained a restrictive covenant pro-
viding for forfeiture upon sale to Mexicans. The court held that to allow this
defense would in effect constitute a judicial determination that the terms of the
racial restrictive covenant be carried out and thus be violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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reported North Carolina decision is of particular importance. In this
case, the grantor deeded land to the City of Charlotte Park and Recrea-
tion Commission to be used as a public recreation park, but limited his
gift with the requirement that:
".... [I] n the event that the said land ... shall not be kept, used
and maintained for park, playground, and/or recreational pur-
poses, for use by the white race only, and if such disuse or non-
maintenance continue for any period as long as one year ...
then ... the lands hereby conveyed shall revert in fee simple to
the [grantor]. . . ." (Emphasis added.)' 0
The court held that if Negroes should use the land, "the determinable
fee 17 . . .automatically will cease and terminate by its own limitation
expressed in the deed, and the estate granted automatically will revert
[to the grantor], by virtue of the limitation in the deed .... The opera-
tion of this reversion provision is not by any judicial enforcement by
the State Courts of North Carolina, and Shelley v. Kraemer has no
application."' 8
The court noted that the racial restrictive provision was included
as a part of the original limitation of a grant in fee simple determinable.
Since this device is seldom used, it may deserve closer examination. An
18242 N. C. at 313, 88 S. E. 2d at 117.
1 The court held that the grantor conveyed a "fee determinable upon special
limitations." 242 N. C. at 321, 88 S. E. 2d at 122. The writer believes that this
is the first North Carolina case which makes this determination in connection
with a full fee interest in the land itself. Prior cases were decided on the basis
of a determinable life estate or determinable easements.
For a collection of state court decisions which have recognized the validity
of determinable fees, see 1 SIMaEs, FuTuRa INTERESTS § 178 n. 10 (1936).
18 242 N. C. at 322, 88 S. E. 2d at 123.
For the purpose of this Note, the author will proceed on the assumption that
the court properly construed the grant to have been in fee simple determinable.
However, some observations must be made in this respect.
The deed provided that ". . . as a condition precedent to the reversion of the
said lands in any such event, the [grantor] shall pay unto the [grantee] .. . the
sum of thirty-five hundred dollars ($3500)." (Emphasis added.) 242 N. C. at 313,
88 S. E. 2d at 117. This condition seems to have been disregarded by both
counsel and court. It raises the question whether the reversion provision might
actually operate automatically upon termination of the estate through use by
Negroes of the recreation park. Assuming that the grantor has a possibility of
reverter until the estate is determined, the provision in the deed requires an af-
firmative act on his part to re-vest the title in him. Professor Simes believes that
the event upon which a possibility of reverter is to vest in possession cannot be
at the exercise of an option by the grantor. 1 SInEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 180(1936). The effect of the provision for payment contained in the deed would be
difficult to distinguish from a power of termination upon breach of condition
subsequent.
Also, the North Carolina court has consistently held that conditions subsequent
which result in the forfeiture of an estate will be strictly construed aqainst the
grantor. Unless the court finds clear and express words of re-entry or forfeiture,
the condition will be considered a covenant. For a thorouqh discussion of de-
feasible estates, see McCall, Fstates on Condition and on Special Limitat;on i
North Carolina, 19 N. C. L. Rvv. 334 (1941).
1955]
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estate in fee simple determinable is created to revest title in the grantor
upon the occurrence of a named event.10 The intent of the grantor
that the estate shall then expire automatically 20 may be expressed by
appropriate words2 ' which provide that upon the happening of the
event the land is to revert2 2 to the conveyor.23 The estate thus granted
is of defeasible quality while the grantor retains a possibility of re-
verter.2 4 When the contingency arises, the estate ipso facto reverts in
accordance with its terms.
2 5
The conveyor's manifest intention that the estate be limited to cer-
tain uses led the court to reason that he had the right to give away
what he chose and to provide that his bounty should be enjoyed only
by those whom he intended to enjoy it. "We know of no law that pro-
hibits a white man from conveying a fee determinable upon the limita-
tion that it shall not be used by members of any race except his own,
nor of any law that prohibits a negro from conveying a fee deter-
minable upon the limitation that it shall not be used by members of
any race, except his own."
'26
The court also stated that the reverter provision must be given
full force and effect lest the grantor be deprived of his property with-
out due process of law.2 7  Conceding that the determinable fee is valid,
if the court decided that the estate could not revert in case Negroes
used the property, a determination of the grantor's rights under the
Due Process Clause would necessarily follow. However, if the limita-
tion were for any reason void, the reverter would become inoperative,
and the grantor's constitutional rights would not seem to be affected.28
"A fee on limitation results if the prevailing purpose is to limit the land for
a stated use. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.6 (1952).
20 It is a basic requirement that the estate shall automatically expire upon
the occurrence of a stated event. 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 44 (1936).
21 "While," "until," "so long as" are typical words to denote the special limita-
tion. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 91 (2d ed. 1920).22 However, no express words of reverter are necessary. 1 SIMEs, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 181 (1936).
231 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 44, comment 1, Illustration 17 (1936).
24 Notwithstanding the qualifications annexed to it, a fee simple determinable
estate constitutes the entire estate throughout its continuance. Church in Brattle
Square v. Grant, 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1855).
2 5 Elmore v. Austin, 232 N. C. 12, 59 S. E. 2d 205 (1950). A fee simple on
special limitation is generally considered not to be within the Rule Against Per-
petuities. First Universalist Society of North Adams v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171,
29 N. E. 524 (1892). A provision designed to prevent use or occupancy of prop-
erty by members of the excluded group is not a restraint of alienation. 4 RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 406, comment in (1936).
2'242 N. C. at 322, 88 S. E. 2d at 123.
" The Court here spoke of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. The writer assumes that the Court intended to refer to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
28 Where an estate in fee simple determinable is created with a special limita-
tion which is void, the gift is good and is no longer subject to the limitation. 2
SIMES. FUTURE INTERESTS § 611 (1936).
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The effect of this decision, in view of what has been stated, is that
restrictive provisions annexed to a grant of land may now be "en-
forced" by resort to the fee simple determinable. The court's abrupt
dismissal of Shelley v. Kraemer was no doubt prompted by a refusal
to read "state action" into the case, relying heavily upon the auto-
matic nature of the reverter. The decision carefully explained that
no court action is ever necessary to terminate the estate and put the
reversion into operation when the stated event occurs.
However, the court did not purport to adjudicate finally all "state
action" aspects as its sole duty was to render construction of the deed.
Although the reversion provision would take effect automatically upon
prohibited use of the land, the grantee might refuse to relinquish pos-
session voluntarily. The grantor would be forced to bring an action
in ejectment, 29 seeking to obtain a judgment declaring the conveyance
forfeited and awarding him possession. Would a judgment in his favor
be "state action" in violation of the grantee's constitutional rights? It
may be contended that a court decree in favor of the grantor would,
under these circumstances, relate back to the time prior to which the
reverter took effect and indirectly enforce the restrictive provisions. If
this construction is accepted, the decree would probably be unenforce-
able as contra to the Shelley rule. However, looking at the reality of
the situation, this action in ejectment would be analogous to an action
by the owner of property against an adverse possessor, and no violation
of the latter's constitutional rights would seem to be involved.
The courts, however, are not the only agency by which the state
acts. In the instant case the title vested in the grantor by "operation
of law," i.e., by operation of the common law of the state. Quaere,
would the operation of the common law of the state be "state action"
within the Shelley v. Kraemer rule and thus be violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment ?30
Also, the grantee may contend that the state's failure to interfere
with the operation of the reversion in essence tolerated its dispossessory
effect, giving force to the restrictions, since timely interference might
have avoided the termination of the grantee's estate.31  However, it
2' 18 Am. Jum., Ejectment § 40 (1939). The party who claims the better title
must, if the actual possession of the land is refused, make a lawful demand for
possession and resort to process of law to recover his property. Mosseller v.
Deaver, 106 N. C. 494, 11 S. E. 529 (1890).
"0"[L]aw in the sense in which the courts speak of it today does not exist
without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is
enforced in a State . . . [is] the law of that State existing by the authority of
that State." Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 79 (1938), citing Justice
Holmes' dissent in Black & White T. & T. Co. v. Brown & Yellow T. & T. Co.,
226 U. S. 518, 533 (1928).
"1 In Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, 469 (1953) Justice Black, writing for
the majority, presented a similar viewpoint in a case which involved the appli-
19551
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would seem that since Shelley v. Kraemer expressly upheld voltntary
action in "enforcement" of restrictive provisions, the unhindered opera-
tion of the grant, like the voluntary execution of a contract, would not
constitute "state action" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 2
Assuming, then, the legal validity of the conveyance, would con-
siderations of public interest tend to override its efficacy? In the Racial
Restrictive Covenant Cases33 the Supreme Court emphasized that "[the
Fourteenth] Amendment erects no shield against merely private con-
duct";34 that the legal devices containing such restrictions are not
against public policy. A distinction between those cases and the prin-
cipal case may be drawn at this point. Shelley v. Kraemer and Jackson
v. Barrows dealt with conveyances of property between private parties
for private use. The instant case, on the other hand, contains certain
restrictive requirements imposed on the City of Charlotte and the Char-
lotte Park and Recreation Commission, a municipal corporation, for
public use. Have the courts established a different policy as to public
use, as distinguished from private use?
In 1896 the Supreme Court recognized that equal protection was
accorded where substantially equal but separate facilities were provided
by a public transportation system.3 5 The same principle was consistent-
ly applied in subsequent state and federal cases on the use of public
recreational facilities,3 6 golf courses, 37 swimming pools, 3 8 tenement hous-
cation of the Fifteenth Amendment to test the Texas pre-primary. He declared
that the state's condonation of the use of the jaybird pre-primary as an electoral
device violated the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment and took the position
that mere failure to suppress a practice not even unlawful under state law, but
affecting the rights of its Negro citizens, was such state action as prohibited by
the Amendment. "A state may not permit within its borders the use of any device
that produces an equivalent of [a violation]."
"2 However, in the absence of state action, voluntary discriminatory practices
may nevertheless be unlawful per se since they may act as a general restraint
on mortgage lending and similar activities affecting interstate commerce. Com-
ment, Application of the Sherman Act to Housing Segregation, 63 YALE L. J.
1124 (1954).
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24
(1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
"4 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra at 13 (1948).
5 The "Separate but Equal" doctrine apparently originated in Massachusetts
where a school board resolution to provide separate facilities for Negro children
in Boston was upheld in Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849). It was
formally announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) which established
a test of reasonableness based on usage, customs and traditions of the people and
the preservation of the public peace and good order.
" There seem to be no affirmative decisions in the Supreme Court on the
validity of the "Separate but Equal" doctrine in the field of public recreation.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U. S. 974 (1954)
("Separate but Equal" sustained in lower court) ; Williams v. Kansas City, Mo..
346 U. S. 826 (1953) (injunctive relief granted below) ; Rice v. Arnold, 342
U. S. 946 (1952) (Florida court had held that proper procedure to test the issue
was by bill for declaratory judgment or in mandamus); Boyer v. Garrett, 340
U. S. 912 (1951) (application for certiorari not filed within time limits). Con-
versely, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated in Berry v. Durham, 186
[Vol. 34
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ing3" and places of entertainment. 40 It endured until the Court in Brown
v. Board of Education41 examined its applicability in the light of cur-
rent knowledge of human relations. 4- The Supreme Court found in that
case that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal, ' 43 though
physical facilities and other "tangible" factors were substantially equal.
In a technical sense, the School Cases do not invalidate separate but
equal facilities as a matter of public policy except in the use of grade-
school buildings. Yet, it seems to be certain that they do have a bearing
on decisions in other fields.
44
One week after the Brown decision, the Supreme Court handed
N. C. 421, 119 S. E. 748 (1923) that restrictive covenants were in accord with
practice and policy and that reasonable regulations may be made to separate
the races.
"'Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F. 2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. den. 347 U. S. 974
(1954).
" Kansas City, Mo. v. Williams, 205 F. 2d 47 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. den.
346 U. S. 826 (1953). Cf. Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S. D. Cal. 1944)(citizens of Mexican descent are entitled to equal rights and privileges).
"Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N. Y. 512, 87 N. E. 2d 541 (1949),
cert. den. 339 U. S. 981 (1950), held that a private corporation organized to pro-
vide low-cost housing is not an agency of the state and as such not prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment from discriminating against tenants because of
race or color, although it derived public aid through partial tax exemption and
permission to buy land, acquired by the exercise of the state's power of eminent
domain, at cost.
40 Harris v. Daytona Beach, 105 F. Supp. 572 (S. D. Fla. 1952).
" 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court found it
neither necessary nor desirable to re-examine the principle of "separate but
equal" facilities in the field of education, though it had several opportunities to
do so. Missouri ex. rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v.
University of Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631 (1948); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950). In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), the
Supreme Court stated that it was unnecessary to deal with that doctrine in the
light of contemporary knowledge respecting the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the effect on racial segregation.
" Compare the language used in the Brown case: "Segregation of white and
colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of law, for the policy
of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of the child to learn,"
347 U. S. at 494, with the following statement from Plessy v. Ferguson, 165
U. S. 537, 551 (1896): "Laws permitting and even requiring separation .. .
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other.... We con-
sider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assump-
tion that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with
a badge of inferiority."
The juxtaposition of the two statements clearly indicates the change in the
Supreme Court's attitude toward this basic problem.(The quoted passage from the Brown case, supra, was cited by the Supreme
Court as a "finding in the Kansas case" [referring to the District Court's decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kansas 1951)]. However,
the quotation is not contained in the published opinion of the Kansas District
Court.)43347 U. S. at 495.
44 "What the [Equal Protection] clause appears to require today is ...that
there shall be no distinction made on the sole basis of race or alienage as to
certain rights." CoRwI N, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 204
(9th ed. 1947).
1955]
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down six memorandum decisions, 45 one of which involved the refusal
of admission of Negroes to an amphitheater leased by a private theatri-
cal company in a public park.46 The trial court had held the company
not guilty of unlawful discrimination in excluding the Negroes from its
performances. The Supreme Court vacated the ruling and remanded
for consideration in the light of the Brown case. 47 This is a strong
indication that the policy announced in the School Cases would be ap-
plied to recreational facilities.
A recent circuit court decision makes it even more apparent that
an extension of the School Cases doctrine is being made in other fields.
In an action brought to abolish separate facilities for the races on city
busses, the South Carolina District Court observed that ". . . to hold
that the Brown decision extends to the field of public transportation
would be an unwarranted enlargement of the doctrine . . . . One's
education and personality is (sic) not developed on a city bus.' '8 How-
ever, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the lower court,
stated that ". . . the recent decisions in Brown v. Board of Education
and Bolling v. Sharpe which relate to public schools, leave no doubt that
the separate but equal doctrine approved in Plessy v. Ferguson has been
repudiated. That the principle applied in the school cases should be
applied in cases involving transportation, appears quite clearly from
the recent case of Henderson v. United States where segregation in
dining cars was held violative of a section of the interstate commerce
act providing against discrimination." 4
9
"'Three of the six decisions were concerned with education. The Court va-
cated judgments against Negro applicants to the University of Florida in State of
Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 347 U. S. 971 (1954) and
Louisiana State University in Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana
State University, 347 U. S. 971 (1954). These two cases were remanded for
consideration in the light of the Brown decision. In the third case, the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari and refused to review a ruling by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals that denial of admission to a Texas junior college based on
proof of equal facilities in Negro schools was violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. Wichita Falls junior College District v. Battle, 347 U. S. 974 (1954).
In Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U. S. 974 (1954), the court below was directed to
enter judgment which required a municipality to admit Negroes on a substan-
tially equal basis with white citizens to a public golf course, and in Housing
Authority of the City and County of San Francisco v. Banks, 347 U. S. 974
(1954) the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the California court to review ajudgment requiring a local housing board to admit Negroes on an equal basis
with other residents. However, none of these cases involved a direct ruling on
the issue of segregation.
"'Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U. S. 971 (1954).
"' Sweeney v. Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525 (W. D. Ky. 1951), aff'd sub non.
Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 202 F. 2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), vacated
347 U. S. 971 (1954).
48 Flemming v. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., 128 F. Supp. 469, 470
(E.D.S.C. 1955).
"' Flemming v. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., 224 F. 2d 752 (4th Cir.
1955), appeal docketed, 24 U. S. L. WEEI 3138 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1955) (No. 511).
The School Segregation Cases also influenced a recent Interstate Commerce
[Vol. 34
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Perhaps of greatest significance is a recent decision of the Supreme
Court itself. In an action"0 brought by Negroes to obtain a declara-
tory judgment and injunctive relief against the enforcement of racial
segregation on public bathing beaches, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the combined effect of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions51 was to deny segregation in public places. 52  Evidently this
court felt that a public policy had been established by the Supreme
Court which would apply to cases of this character. 53 The Supreme
Court affirmed the circuit court's decision.5 4
Thus, there is reason to believe that the principles underlying these
decisions may be extended to the North Carolina case.55 A considera-
tion of the instant controversy"5 may give the United States Supreme
Court an opportunity to make that decision.
PETER H. GERNS
Commission decision banning segregation of white and Negro passengers in inter-
state transportation. The Commission held that segregation of interstate pas-
sengers violated the Interstate Commerce Act's provisions against undue prefer-
ences and prejudices. Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 24 U. S. L. WEEK 2234 (I.C.C.
Nov. 7, 1955) (busses); National Assn. for Advancement of Colored People v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 24 U. S. L. WEEK 2234 (I.C.C. Nov. 7, 1955)(railroads).
'o Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 220 F. 2d 386 (4th
Cir. 1955).
"The Court referred to McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637(1950) ; Henderson v. U. S., 339 U. S. 816 (1950) ; Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) ; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). In the
McLaurin case, the Supreme Court stated that a Negro, admitted to the same
school as whites, need not sit in a special part of the class room, library, and
cafeteria, so as to be apart from white students. His education and mental
growth would suffer by the inequalities imposed upon him. In the Henderson
case, the court denounced the artificiality of treatment to which Negroes on
railroad dining cars were subjected.
r "[If the state's] power cannot be invoked to sustain racial segregation in
the schools, where attendance is compulsory and racial friction may be appre-
hended from the enforced commingling of the races, it cannot be sustained with
respect to public beach and bathhouse facilities, the use of which is entirely
optional." 220 F. 2d at 387.
" Some writers repeatedly have suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to protect the rights of the individuals from individual action as well
as from action by the states. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTii AMEND-
MENT 277 (1908) ; Hale, Rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAW GuniD REv. 627 (1946).
Also note Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559(1896) : "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens."
" Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U. S. -, 100 L. Ed.
(Advance p. 75) (1955).
" "The protection of the Constitution extends to sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of discrimination." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275 (1939).
" The instant case is pending on a petition for re-hearing in the Supreme
Court of North Carolina and may be the subject of an application for a writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Letter from Spotts-
wood W. Robinson, III, Attorney for co-Defendants Leeper et al. to the author,
Sept. 28, 1955.
1955]
